The Epistemic Worth of Moral Intuitionism in Contemporary Moral Psychology: Assessing Justification, Reliability, and the Prospects for a Coherent Moral Epistemology

Project Abstract

Moral intuitionism has long stood at the crossroads of foundational ethics and empirical psychology, prompting a rigorous examination of its epistemic status in light of contemporary cognitive science, moral psychology, and normative theory. This abstract synthesizes a project that interrogates the justification, reliability, and coherence of moral intuitions as a source of moral knowledge, and assesses the prospects for a unified epistemology that accommodates both phenomenology and empirical findings. The study engages with foundational positions from classical intuitionism, such as a priori or non-inferential grounding of moral truth, and contrasts them with empirical critiques that emphasize cognitive biases, heuristic processing, and cultural variation. A central aim is to delineate criteria for justificatory strength in moral intuitionism, including (a) criteria of inferential legitimacy for moral judgments generated by immediate intuitions, (b) the role of reflective equilibrium and moral reasoning in moderating initial contents, and (c) the extent to which intuition-based claims can withstand cross-cultural and developmental scrutiny without sacrificing normative prescriptivity. Methodologically, the project employs a multi-method approach, integrating a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies on moral judgments, an examination of methodological diversity in how intuitions are elicited, and a critical appraisal of how reliabilist and invariance-based theories of justification fare when confronted with empirical data. It also investigates the epistemic virtues and vices of moral intuitions, including sensitivity to context, scope, and the potential for error through motivational biases, emotional states, and framing effects. The research further explores the compatibility of intuitive data with coherent moral epistemology by evaluating models that incorporate mechanism-focused explanations (e.g., dual-process theory) and structure-preserving normative constraints (e.g., coherence, consistency, and argumentative defensibility). This project considers rival accounts such as moral realism, constructivism, and sentimentalist approaches, assessing whether a hybrid framework can preserve the epistemic legitimacy of moral intuitions while acknowledging fallibility. It also probes the implications for practical ethics, policy, and education, including how intuition-based insights can inform but not dictate moral deliberation. The anticipated outcomes include a clarified map of when moral intuitions function as reliable epistemic guides, when they require correction or supplementation by reflective analysis, and how a coherent moral epistemology might be operationalized in both theoretical and applied contexts. By articulating explicit criteria for justification, reliability, and coherence, the study aims to contribute a nuanced account that reconciles the experiential accessibility of moral judgments with the stringent demands of rational justification. The project ultimately proposes a framework for integrating intuitive data with rigorous normative theory to illuminate the epistemic foundations of moral judgment in contemporary psychology.

Project Overview

What This Project Is About

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A straightforward examination of moral intuitionism—the idea that our immediate moral judgments are meaningful and potentially correct—within modern psychology. The project asks how much we should trust these gut feelings when making moral assessments, and whether they can form a reliable basis for a coherent system of moral knowledge.

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The Problem It Addresses

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Psychology shows people often rely on quick moral judgments that can be biased or inconsistent. The problem is to determine when intuition gives good justification and when it misleads, and how to balance these judgments with careful reasoning to avoid a fragmented moral theory.

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Objectives of the Project

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1. Clarify key terms: intuition, justification, and reliability in moral thinking.
2. Review major theories of moral intuitionism and competing views.
3. Assess empirical findings on the reliability of moral intuitions across contexts.
4. Evaluate what counts as a coherent moral epistemology.
5. Propose criteria for when moral intuitions should guide ethical reasoning.

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What You Will Do Step by Step

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1) Read foundational and contemporary sources on moral intuitionism. 2) Summarize core arguments and empirical results. 3) Identify cases where intuitions align or clash with reasoning. 4) Analyze how to integrate intuitions with justification standards. 5) Draft a framework for a coherent epistemology of morality. 6) Discuss limitations and open questions.

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Expected Outcome

A clear, student-friendly framework that explains when moral intuitions can justify beliefs, how to improve reliability, and how to combine intuition with reasoning to support a cohesive moral epistemology. The result should help students decide if they want to pursue deeper research in moral psychology.