The Epistemic Justification of Moral Realism: A Critical Analysis of Reliance on Intuition and Conceptual Analysis in Moral Knowledge

Project Abstract

The Epistemic Justification of Moral Realism hinges on a careful examination of how moral knowledge is acquired and validated, particularly through intuitive apprehension and conceptual analysis, and whether these methods can support robust ontological commitments to moral realism. This abstract outlines a research program that interrogates the epistemic foundations of moral realism by tracing the justificatory role of moral intuitions, examining the reliability and universality of such intuitions across diverse individuals and cultures, and assessing the inferential processes by which moral concepts are formed and reinforced. The study investigates the extent to which intuition-based data can constitute objective evidence of moral facts, accounting for known biases, cultural variability, and the potential influence of moral psychology on reflective equilibrium. It also scrutinizes conceptual analysis as a methodological paradigm in ethics, evaluating whether it yields theory-grounded, cross-culturalizable criteria for moral correctness or whether it merely restates presupposed normative commitments in more precise terms. A central aim is to determine if a coherent reconstruction of moral realism can be achieved without sacrificing explanatory adequacy, by delineating how moral facts might be detectable through principled, non-reductive analyses of moral language, practice, and justification. This research engages with key anti-realist challenges, including the reliability problem for intuition, the argument from skepticism about moral knowledge, and the underdetermination of theory by data, to assess whether moral realism can withstand epistemic scrutiny. Methodologically, the project employs a multi-method approach a) a rigorous meta-analysis of empirical studies on moral intuition and its susceptibility to bias; b) a critical reconstruction of influential intuition-based arguments for realism, together with their counterarguments; c) a systematic appraisal of conceptual analysis in moral philosophy, with attention to boundary conditions, definitional disputes, and cross-cultural applicability; d) a normative-explanatory framework that links epistemic justification with moral explanation and normativity. The expected outcomes include a clarified map of when intuitive and conceptual methods can contribute legitimately to moral realism, a delineation of the conditions under which such methods yield robust justification, and a proposal for a hybrid epistemic model that integrates empirical psychology with analytic philosophy to ground moral realism in defensible epistemic practices. The study also aims to contribute to ongoing debates about moral epistemology by providing precise criteria for evaluating the justificatory force of intuition and conceptual analysis, offering a nuanced account of how moral facts might be known, and outlining implications for metaethics, normative theory, and the methodology of philosophy. Overall, the project aspires to advance a more transparent and methodologically rigorous defense of moral realism that is responsive to contemporary empirical insights and conceptual critiques.

Project Overview

What This Project Is About

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This project explores how philosophers justify moral realism — the view that moral truths exist independently of what people think. It focuses on two common methods used to support these claims: intuition (our immediate moral judgments) and conceptual analysis (examining the meanings of moral terms). It asks whether trusting our gut feelings or analyzing how we think about right and wrong gives reliable knowledge about moral facts.

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The Problem It Addresses

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Many debates in ethics rely on intuition and analysis to claim that there are objective moral truths. Critics argue these methods can be biased, limited, or circular. The project investigates whether these approaches can coherently justify moral realism or if they fail to provide solid knowledge about morality, with implications for theory and real-world decision making.

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Objectives of the Project

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1. Assess what counts as justification in moral knowledge.
2. Examine how intuition is used in moral claims and where it may mislead.
3. Analyze the role of conceptual analysis in shaping moral realism.
4. Identify strengths and weaknesses of these methods.
5. Offer clearer criteria for when moral judgments can be considered knowledge claims.

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What You Will Do Step by Step

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1) Review key literature on moral realism, intuition, and conceptual analysis.

2) Map arguments that rely on intuition to support moral facts.

3) Evaluate conceptual analysis for its ability to justify realism.

4) Compare rival views (anti-realism, error theory) to identify gaps.

5) Build a concise framework for assessing moral justified belief.

6) Apply the framework to a few case examples (e.g., basic moral intuitions).

7) Reflect on broader implications for ethics and education.

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Expected Outcome

An accessible analysis that clarifies whether intuition and conceptual analysis can reliably support moral realism, with practical guidelines for evaluating moral claims in philosophy and everyday life.