Critical examination of george edward moore’s direct realist epistemological account of cognition
Table Of Contents
Chapter ONE
INTRODUCTION
- 1.1Introduction
- 1.2Background of Study
- 1.3Problem Statement
- 1.4Objective of Study
- 1.5Limitation of Study
- 1.6Scope of Study
- 1.7Significance of Study
- 1.8Structure of the Research
- 1.9Definition of Terms
Chapter TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
- 2.1Overview of Direct Realism
- 2.2George Edward Moore's Epistemological Account
- 2.3Critiques of Moore's Direct Realist Epistemology
- 2.4Contemporary Perspectives on Direct Realism
- 2.5Relation of Cognition to Direct Realism
- 2.6Empirical Evidence Supporting Direct Realism
- 2.7Philosophical Debates on Direct Realism
- 2.8Applications of Direct Realist Epistemology
- 2.9Limitations of Direct Realism
- 2.10Future Directions in Direct Realism Research
Chapter THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
- 3.1Research Methodology Overview
- 3.2Research Design and Approach
- 3.3Data Collection Methods
- 3.4Sampling Techniques
- 3.5Data Analysis Procedures
- 3.6Ethical Considerations
- 3.7Validity and Reliability Measures
- 3.8Limitations of the Research Methodology
Chapter FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
- 4.1Overview of Findings
- 4.2Analysis of Data
- 4.3Comparison with Existing Literature
- 4.4Interpretation of Results
- 4.5Implications of Findings
- 4.6Contributions to the Field
- 4.7Recommendations for Future Research
- 4.8Practical Applications of the Findings
Chapter FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- 5.1Conclusion and Summary of Research
- 5.2Recapitulation of Key Findings
- 5.3Implications for Theory and Practice
- 5.4Contributions to Knowledge
- 5.5Suggestions for Further Studies
Project Abstract
<p> George Edward Moore, in his quest to establish a direct realist account of cognition and to refute skepticism and absolute idealism, which is a brand of metaphysical monism, argued that at least some of our beliefs about the world are absolutely certain. Moore argues that these beliefs are ‘commonsense’. All the arguments put forth by G.E. Moore in his classic works; <em>A Defense of Commonsense</em>, <em>Proof</em> <em>of An External World</em>,<em> The Nature of Judgment</em>,<em> Refutation of Idealism </em>and<em>A Reply to My Critics</em> are all in a bid to prove the existence of an absolute external world whose existence is perceivable (knowable) via the ‘Commonsense’ understanding of reality (actuality). Although, Moore’s direct realist account of cognition states that perception or cognition of the external world is gained via the senses directly unmediated, such that there is no gap between the human mind and external world objects. However, it was discovered that the relationship between the distal stimulus and its percept was indirect; though for Moore the relationship between the distal stimulus and its percept is direct. Moore’s ontological account of cognition was quite unique and illuminating; however his ontological account of cognition was inadequate. The tenability of Moore’s position is questionable because it can only be sustained on the basis of naturalization of all epistemological account of cognition in relation to a given consensual language domain. <br></p>
Project Overview
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</p><p><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></p><p><strong>1.1 </strong><strong>Background of the Study</strong></p><p>This research work was motivated by some of the intricate</p><p>issues raised by Absolute idealism (Metaphysical monism) to interpret with certainty and objectivity existent reality. Some of these issues are summarized as follows:</p><p>(i) All realities are internally related (doctrine of internal relations)</p><p>(ii) The objective truths (for example, of logic mathematics, ethics, etc) are to be accounted for in terms of the operations of the subjective cognitive or psychological faculties (psychologism).</p><p>(iii) Objective knowledge is of the universal.</p><p>(iv) There exist universal minds to which others are subsumed.</p><p>(v) Phenomenological and external realities are copies of original that exist in the world of forms.</p>
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