THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE OPERATION OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME IN NIGERIA

Project Abstract

Deposit Insurance System (DIS) has become a key component of most financial systems worldwide because of the important roles it plays in protecting depositors as well as contributing to financial system stability. Since its establishment by the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Decree No. 22 of 1988, the NDIC, which is charged with deposit protection mandate has remained an active safety-net player in spite of many daunting challenges. The establishment of the corporation was bore out of necessity over two decades ago when the Federal Government conceived the idea of the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in which the deregulation of the banking system would constitute an unholden central pillar. The NDIC has been faced with numerous challenges that have hampered the effective and efficient implementation of the Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) in Nigeria. Thus, this research work aims at examining these challenges and to proffer sound recommendations. Firstly, the corporation is faced today with the challenge of execution of court judgement against its assets for liability of banks in liquidation. This is because courts normally regard the NDIC as a successor-in-title of failed banks. Secondly, the amount fixed as maximum deposit claim under section 20(1) of the NDIC Act, 2010 to all the classes of depositors and regardless of the amount of deposit lost by a depositor in the event of failure of a deposit-taking financial institution is not reasonable. Thirdly, the penalty provided under section 45 of the NDIC Act, 2010 for non-compliance with its provisions and failure to secure the authenticity of any statement submitted pursuant to the provision of Act is less punitive. Consequently, it is hereby recommended that the NDIC Act, 2010 should further be amended to bar courts from executing judgement against the assets of the Corporation as a result of its statutory mandate as a liquidator of failed banks. Secondly, reimbursement of deposit lost by a depositor in the event of failure of an insured deposit-taking institution should be made full as this will encourage savings. Finally, the penalty provided under section 45 of the NDIC Act, 2010 should be increased by making it more punitive so as to encourage compliance. For the purpose of this research work, the doctrinal method of research will be adopted.

Project Overview

GENERAL INTRODUCTION1.0            Background of the StudyIn recognition of the strategic importance of a stable banking system to an economy, various institutional arrangements have evolved overtime to foster banking stability; one of such initiatives is the establishment of a deposit protection scheme which is aimed at curtailing the attendant economic disruptions that typically follow bank failures. Among the consequences of these disruptions is the loss of deposits held in the failed bank and the inclination of the depositors of other banks to make panic withdrawal of their deposits in a manner capable of precipitating a run on those otherwise sound banks1. Banking business is so important to the economy of any nation that nowhere in the world is that business left to the whims and caprices of the business owners (shareholders) without appropriate regulation and supervision. There are so many reasons for this. Firstly, the bank plays the role of financial intermediation; where surplus fund are mobilized in form of deposits by the depositors and such funds are then channeled to entrepreneurs in the form of loans and advances for business development, giving rise to employment, wealth creation and growth.That is why banking is often described as the engine room of the economy. Thus, when the banking system collapses, the economy also collapses. The second reason for regulation and supervision is that the share capital brought to the banking business by the shareholders is usually a small fraction when compared to the volume of funds mobilized by the banks from depositors who perhaps are really the