Thesis Abstract

Abstract
Robert Nozick is a prominent figure in political philosophy, known for his influential work "Anarchy, State, and Utopia." This research project critically examines Nozick's political philosophy, focusing on key aspects such as his principles of justice, minimal state theory, and the entitlement theory of justice. Nozick's libertarian views have sparked significant debate and critique in the field of political philosophy. This research delves into the strengths and weaknesses of Nozick's arguments, analyzing how they contribute to the broader discourse on justice and political theory. The critique of Nozick's political philosophy begins by exploring his concept of the minimal state and its role in his vision of a just society. Nozick argues for a limited government that only intervenes to protect individual rights, rejecting the idea of a more proactive welfare state. Critics have raised concerns about the potential shortcomings of such a minimal state, particularly in addressing issues of distributive justice and social inequalities. Furthermore, this research project evaluates Nozick's entitlement theory of justice, which posits that individuals are entitled to their holdings as long as they have acquired them through legitimate means. While this theory emphasizes individual rights and autonomy, it has been criticized for neglecting the historical context in which property rights are established and the potential for unequal starting positions among individuals. The analysis also delves into Nozick's principles of justice, including his distinction between historical and end-state principles. Nozick argues against principles that aim to achieve a particular end-state distribution of resources, favoring instead a historical approach that focuses on how individuals acquire and transfer their holdings. Critics question the feasibility and fairness of Nozick's historical principles, highlighting the challenges of applying them in practice and their implications for social justice. Overall, this research project provides a comprehensive critique of Robert Nozick's political philosophy, examining the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments on justice, the state, and individual rights. By engaging with Nozick's ideas in depth, this study contributes to a nuanced understanding of libertarian political theory and its implications for contemporary debates on justice and equality.

Thesis Overview

1.1   INTRODUCTION

Robert Nozick (1938-2002) was American philosopher, best known for his rigorous defense of libertarianism in his first major work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). During his high school and college years, Nozick was a member of the student new left and an enthusiastic socialist. At Columbia, he helped to found a campus branch of the league for industrial democracy, a precursor of the students for a democratic society. While in graduate school he read works by libertarian thinkers such as F. A. Hayak and Ludwig Von Mises, and his political views began to change. His conversion to libertarianism culminated in 1974 with the publication of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, a closely argued and highly original defense of the libertarian “minimal state” and a critique of the social-democratic liberalism of John Rowls.

The  main body of this work falls into four parts; firstly the underpinning (if any) and the character and robustness of the moral rights that constitute the basic normative framework for most of Anarchy, State and Utopia. Secondly, the character and degree of success of Nozick’s defense of the minimal state against the charge by the individualist anarchist that “the state itself is intrinsically immoral”. Thirdly, Nozick’s articulation and defense of his historical entitlement doctrine of justice in holdings and his associated critique of end-state and patterned doctrines of distributive justice, especially John Rawls’ difference principle (as defended in a theory of justice) and fourthly Nozick’s argument that utopian aspirations provide a complementary route to the vindication of the minimal state.

1.2   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Nozick’s natural rights – particularly the right of self-ownership and the consequent right to the fruit’s of one’s labour present an obvious problems if we desire any state at all, no matter how minimal.